Algunas de las preguntas fundamentales de la filosofía del arte son: 1) ¿Qué es una obra de arte?, 2) ¿Qué es Arte?, 3) ¿Qué es el arte? Responderlas es determinar el sentido del arte. Este tipo de preguntas están planteadas bajo la fórmula ¿Qué es X?, es decir, preguntas en las cuales en lo simple esta lo complejo, preguntas en donde lo simple no quiere decir que sean sencillas; son preguntas que traen dentro de si su naturaleza y carácter metafísico-ontológico-gnoseológico, (...) y hasta axiológico. No es el propósito de este trabajo hacer frente o resolver estos problemas, sino proporcionar una aproximación al concepto de “obra de arte” en la época actual y como podría entenderse en relación a ciertos problemas ontológicos y epistemológicos actuales. -/- [Extended Version of: Vélez León, Paulo (2006). «Aproximaciones a la ¿obra de arte?». En Políticas al borde. Una investigación sobre el arte contemporáneo cuencano en los discursos políticos actuales, editado por Paulo Vélez León y Hernán Pacucuru. Cuenca: Universidad de Cuenca/Bienal Internacional de Cuenca, 2006, pp. 1-12]. (shrink)

An important question in the debate regarding the nature of politically significant human kinds, such as gender, race, and sexual orientations, is concerned with the question of whether these human kinds are socially constructed (Stein 1999; Root 2000; Haslanger 2012; and Ásta 2013). In order to settle this debate, a more fundamental question needs to be answered: what does it mean to say that a category is socially constructed? -/- Recently, many philosophers have become interested in this issue (Hacking 1999; (...) Stein 1999; Haslanger 2003; Mallon 2007; Diaz-Leon 2015; Ásta 2015). They all seem to agree that there is not a single notion of social construction, but rather, there are different notions of social construction for different purposes. The important question in order to formulate a useful notion of social construction, then, is which project is at issue, and which notion of social construction is more useful for the purposes of that project. In this chapter I will focus on two projects that social constructivists are often interested in, namely, (i) the project of arguing against the inevitability of a trait, that is, to show that those features are not determined by human nature; and (ii) the project of arguing against the universality of a trait, that is, to show that a certain human category or kind is not a universal, transcultural, culture-independent property and that it cannot be applied to other cultures, places, and times; and I will discuss which notion of social construction is more useful with respect to each project. -/- My main questions, then, will be the following: (a) Is there any notion of social construction that entails that if X is socially constructed, then X is not inevitable, that is, X is not determined by human nature? (b) Is there any notion of social construction that entails that if X is socially constructed, then X is not transcultural or universal? (shrink)

This paper deals with calibration in scientific practices which investigate relatively well-understood natural phenomena by means of already standardized instrumental devices. Calibration is a crucial topic, since it conditions the reliability of instrumental procedures in science. Yet although important, calibration is a relatively neglected topic. We think more attention should be devoted to calibration. The paper attempts to take a step in this direction. The aims are two-fold: (1) to characterize calibration in a relatively simple kind of scientific practices; (2) (...) to provide conceptual and taxonomic tools of broader scope that help to get a better understanding of calibration in more complex cases and other kinds of scientific practices. For this purpose, we first provide indications for why a conceptual framework is needed. Second, a bibliographic survey of works dealing with calibration is attempted. Third, we introduce different tools to enable a better understanding of calibration. Fourth, we turn to the elaboration of what we call a “simple exemplar” of calibration, illustrated through the case of the calibration of an equal-arm balance. Fifth, the tools previously introduced, and the framework of the simple exemplar, are applied to a more complex case of calibration: calibration procedures in X-ray experiments. This serves to show the work accomplished by the simple exemplar and to emphasize features of more complex cases of calibration. Eventually, we revisit and specify the nature, status, scope and value of the proposed framework. (shrink)

In the first part of the paper three concepts of system are introduced. The first is the following ordered set: S = , where S is a given system, C is the set of its parts, R1, ..., Rk are relations between these parts, Rk+1, ..., Rk+m are relations between parts of S and its environment U. This concept does not take into account the fact that real things change. Thus it is the concept of abstract system. The second concept (...) takes changes of systems for granted. At every period i the system is slightly different. At the periods i Si is a set of sections of a real system: Si = , where {C}i is the set of sets of parts of S, {R1, ..., Rk}i and {Rk+1, ..., Rk+m}i are sets of relations. Different sections of a system are similar; the same holds for the relations and the subsequent environments. To describe the evolution of systems these similarity-relations have to be considered. Let the relations between the C's, the parts of the system, be symbolized as X, the similarity relations between the {R1, ..., Rk} pointed to by T, and the relations between the other sets of relations marked by Z. Let W be asigned to the relations between the succesive environments. SI is a system which lasts during the period I and changes in this time. The period I is in fact identical with i. The symbol SI was introduced to point to the relations S, T, Z, W, which were absent in the definition of Si. Now we have the following third concept of system: SI = . In the second part of the paper the relation X is analysed, when C consists of statements and S is a theory. The relation is to the effect that statements of later stages of a theory refer to n-tuples which exhibit more arguments that the relation spoken of at earlier stages of the theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethics, Theory and the NovelLeon SuretteEthics, Theory and the Novel, by David Parker; x & 218 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, $54.95.David Parker’s stated purpose in Ethics, Theory and the Novel is to ground the value of “canonical works” of literature in the “ethical interest,” which each of them embodies in the meditation and exploration of “the clashes of moral value” (p. 38). He is self-consciously responding (...) to the strictures of neo-Marxism, feminism, and deconstruction which allegedly see “the canon simply as the repository of conservative values” and therefore reject it (p. 51). In order to demonstrate this capacity of imaginative literature Parker provides ethical analyses of scenes in George Eliot’s Middlemarch, Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, and D. H. Lawrence’s The White Peacock, Women in Love, and Lady Chatterley’s Lover. The book divides into two projects, since Parker also argues for the pertinence of ethics itself quite apart from the value of imaginative literature as a repository of serious ethical thought. Part one makes the theoretical case, and part two applies the theory.For the theory he takes as his champions Martha Nussbaum, Iris Murdoch, the late Australian critic, S. L. Golberg, and the Canadian political scientist, Charles Taylor. From Nussbaum he derives the claim that “literature can be moral philosophy” (p. 34). From Taylor he takes a triadic schema of Western [End Page 247] culture: Judeo-Christian-Kantian, Liberal-Enlightenment-rational, and Romantic-irrational-egoistic (p. 20) as the sources of our ethical thinking. Murdoch and Goldberg are deployed as predecessors in his own practice of ethical analysis of literary works. Parker’s claim is that imaginative literature exhibits the dynamic tensions of these conflicting ethical discourses.Parker’s discussion is intelligent and well-informed. His position is, in my view, perfectly defensible—indeed traditional. That said, this book seems to be as much a symptom of the malaise afflicting literary criticism as a cure. To this reader the theoretical portion is not faithful to any of his champions, but is a dog’s breakfast of “theoretical” postures gathered from Derrida, Cavell, de Man, Rorty, Foucault, and Frederic Jameson—as well as from those named above. The problem is not that Parker misunderstands or misrepresents their thought, but rather that he treats theoretical discourse as a flea market from which he can assemble pre-owned furniture for his own residence.The practice of literary criticism encourages such rummaging among other people’s belongings. It is appropriate for commentators on a literary work of art to select from previous commentary those observations and insights they regard as sound, and to reject or ignore those viewed as unsound. Nonetheless it is difficult to understand how a discourse which finds one leg in Marxist discourse, a second in Freudian, a third in phenomenological, and a fourth in Heideggerean or Derridean discourse can be expected to stand four square.Ethics, Theory and the Novel can be defended as an exercise in bricolage—and quite an impressive one in its own way. Like the handyman, Parker has cobbled together an ethicist criticism out of what is available or ready-at-hand in other discourses. But—as with many a home project—one can still see its flea market provenance. In his critical analysis of the novels, Parker shows himself to be a careful and perceptive reader. But I must confess that his ethical analyses seemed very like old-fashioned moral analysis of character motivation. I would not disagree with his claim that “an ethical vocabulary... is essential to the full understanding of the created fictional situation” (p. 191). However, his argument for a dialogic plurivocity in the ethical discourse of Western fiction is one that has been previously put by Mikhail Bakhtin from within Marxism. It is, I think, a serious oversight that Bakhtin is never mentioned—even though Parker’s position is distinguishable from Bakhtin’s in that his dialogue is between perennial ethical schemata and Bakhtin’s is between hegemonic and subversive discourses.Leon SuretteUniversity of Western OntarioCopyright © 1996 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

Il s’agit d’approfondir la comparaison de l’ « activité d’immobilité » [Χν≅ργεια 3κινησBας] au repos en Éthique à Nic. VII 15, 1154 b 21-31, et en cela de montrer en quoi ils sont identiques et en quoi ils sont différents. Le point de départ est que Aristote vise avant tout l’activité du premier moteur et qu’il a conçu tout d’abord l’ « activité d’immobilité » pour expliquer la continuité éternelle du mouvement du ciel. Cela conduit naturellement à la Physique où (...) le premier moteur et le repos sont définis. Le passage le plus important est certainement VI 8, 239 a 23 - b 4 où les deux sont également traités. Mais c’est aussi un des passages les plus litigieux, car la lecture proposée dans cet article n’est pas celle qui est proposée généralement par les traducteurs et commentateurs qui ne rattachent pas ce passage à ce qui précède, mais le considère comme une préfiguration du chapitre 9 où se trouvent exposés les problèmes de Zénon. Une grande part de l’article est consacrée à l’analyse de leur lecture, afin de redonner à ce passage la position clé qu’il mérite comme un jalon sur le chemin qui conduit à poser l’éternelle immobilité du premier moteur à la fin de la Physique. Ce passage est crucial, car Aristote y distingue l’activité du premier moteur immobile du repos en l’affirmant « dans l’instant » comme il l’avait fait d’ailleurs en Éthique à Nic. X 3, 1174 b 9 en distinguant l’ « activité d’immobilité » du mouvement. L’une des thèses avancées dans cet article est que seule l’instantanéité permet à cette activité d’être principe d’éternité. (shrink)

This is the first English translation of Leon Chwistek’s “Tragedia werbalnej metafizyki,” Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, Vol. X, 1932, 46–76. Chwistek offers a scathing critique of Roman Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk and of the entire Phenomenology movement. The text also contains many hints at Chwistek’s own philosophical and formal ideas. The book that Chwistek reviews attracted wide attention and was instrumental in winning Ingarden a position as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Lwów in 1933. Chwistek’s alienation from his fellow (...) logicians of the Lvov-Warsaw school is clear from his ridicule of Leśniewski’s project. (shrink)

Leo Choirosphaktes' didactic poem Thousand-Line Theology survives in only one manuscript, Vat. gr. 1257 (s. X), which contains a number of rather unusual poetic texts. The subtitle of Vassis' edition, editio princeps, is – strictly speaking – not entirely correct: the whole text was already edited by Rhoby, and parts of it were published by Magdalino. But Rhoby's dissertation has not been published and Magdalino calls his own edition an “imperfect working transcription”. Moreover, these two editions are hardly as good (...) as that of V. Choirosphaktes' poem is not always easy to understand and the only surviving manuscript renders the comprehension of the text even more difficult, because it offers so many incorrect readings. In a number of manuscripts we find a small excerpt of the poem: if one compares the six verses offered by these manuscripts with the text of Vat. gr. 1257, one notices no less than five corruptions, and most of them very serious ones. For the remaining 1153 verses of the poem, we do not possess another manuscript to check the readings of Vat. gr. 1257, but there can be little doubt that there must be hundreds of errors in the text as transmitted by our only manuscript. Some of these errors are easy to spot for reasons of grammar, metrics and meaning, but other errors may escape our notice, because at first sight there does not seem to be anything wrong with the text. As Choirosphaktes is an accomplished poet who knows very well what he is doing, an editor is obliged to change the text by means of divination and emendation whenever the text is not satisfactory. Lately there has been a tendency among editors to be as conservative as possible, but it remains to be seen whether this in itself laudable conservatism is the right method for all texts. V. rightly follows a less cautious method of editing and corrects the text wherever the text needs correcting. One cannot but admire V.'s courage and assiduity in solving the textual problems and unravelling the many mysteries of the Thousand-Line Theology. This is really an excellent edition. (shrink)

Fessard, G. Jeanne Hersch, genèse d'une œuvre.--Muralt, A. de. Phénoménologie et métaphysique.--Philonenko, A. Leibniz et le platonisme.--Christoff, D. Représentation et décision dans la temporalité selon Kant.--Tilliette, X. De l'illusion au savoir, la philosophie.--Widmer, G. Variations kierkegaardiennes sur l'édifiant.--Dufour-Kowalska, G. L'imagination maîtresse de vérité.--Leyvraz, J.-P. Des noms.--Piguet, J.-C. Liberté esthétique et liberté éthique.--Schaerer, R. Le philosophe entre oui et non.--Scheurer, P.-B. Vues nouvelles sur la science du temps et l'histoire.--Starobinski, J. La littérature et l'irrationnel.--Aron, R. De la libéralisation.--Werner, E. La (...) digue et la vie.--Cottier, G. La fascination du vide, éléments pour un diagnostic. (shrink)